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CONTRACTS-NEGOTIATED CONTRACT PRoVIsIoN WHICH EX-
CLUDED EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE To INTERPRET THE CONTRACT HELD
VOID
After extensive negotiations, plaintiff, a shopping center corporation,
leased property to defendant, a large retail store. One section of the lease
provided that the tenant would bear a pro rata share of the landlord's cost
of maintaining the shopping center's common areas, this share being fixed
by a ratio of floor space occupied by the tenant to total floor space occupied
by all tenants. The section also provided that, in computing the ratio,
floor space beneath the mall (main) level would count only half as much as
other space. However, a rider to the lease fixed the maximum charge for
this service at twenty-five cents per year for each square foot of floor space.
Thereafter, defendant contended that the ratio of the original section
applied to the rider, and that the maximum charge for sub-mall space was
twelve and one-half cents per square foot. In this action, defendant sought
to introduce evidence of the preliminary negotiations 1 to show that its
construction of the rider was correct, but another section of the lease
prohibited the use of "previous negotiations, arrangements, agreements,
and understandings" 2 to interpret the lease. The trial court excluded the
extrinsic evidence but adopted defendant's construction. The New Jersey
Superior Court doubted that defendant's construction of the ambiguous
lease could be sustained without the extrinsic evidence, held the exclu-
sionary provision void,3 and remanded for a new trial. Garden State Plaza
1 Preliminary negotiations are considered probative evidence. See, e.g., Union
Oil Co. v. Union Sugar Co., 31 Cal. 2d 300, 188 P.2d 470 (1948); Olson v. Rosseter,
399 Ill. 232, 77 N.E.2d 652 (1948) ; Atlantic No. Airlines, Inc. v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J.
293, 96 A.2d 652 (1953). See generally 3 CORBn, CONTRACTS § 543 (1960).
2 Instant case at 500, 189 A.2d at 456.
3 Absent fraud, mistake, or accident, parol or extrinsic evidence by which a
party seeks to vary the terms of a valid written agreement is normally excluded.
See generally 3 CoRBINT, CONTRACTS §§ 573-79 (1960); 2 MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS
OF EVIDENCE 396-424 (1961) ; 9 WIGmORE, EViDENCE § 2400 (3d ed. 1940).
The rider clause in the present case, § 4.3(a), provides: "In the event that the
areas of the mall level and lower level are substantially the same, the Landlord
hereby agrees with the Tenant that the Common Area charge payable by Tenant
as provided in Section 4.3 shall not exceed (i) the rate of twenty-five cents . . .
per square foot of Floor Space . . . ." Id. at 489, 189 A.2d at 450. Section 4.3
provides generally for the common area charge and that "in making such computa-
tion . . . all Floor Space . . . shall be weighted as follows: all such Floor Space
on the mall level shall be weighted at one hundred per cent . . . and all such Floor
Space below or above the mall level shall be weighted at fifty per cent . . . ." Ibid.
Section 16.1 provides that the "following terms when used in this lease with the
first letter of each word therein capitalized are defined terms and shall have the
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Corp. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 78 N.J. Super. 485, 189 A. 2d 448 (App. Div.),
cert. denied, 40 N.J. 226, 191 A.2d 63 (1963).
The parol evidence rule was originated to protect written agreements
from potentially fraudulent attempts to repudiate them. The rule requires
that the trier of fact look only to the writing to determine the meaning of
the parties' agreement.4 When contract language is ambiguous, however,
parol evidence is admissible to interpret, but not to vary, the contract.5 In
recent years, New Jersey cases have questioned the vitality of the parol evi-
dence rule; 6 and the trial court in the present case searched the extrinsic
evidence before determining its admissibility.7 The parties to the present
contract, perhaps aware of this judicial trend, attempted to exclude ex-
trinsic evidence at trial, whether or not the contractual provision at issue
was ambiguous.
As a general rule, contracts should be upheld unless there are strong
reasons for voiding them.8 Courts have upheld provisions in adhesion
contracts 9 that admit otherwise excludable evidence in the event of litiga-
meanings set forth in this Section (and only such meanings)." It then defines
Floor Space as "the actual number of square feet of floor space . . . within
the exterior faces of the walls . . . ." Brief for Appellant, p. 3, instant case.
Read literally, §4.3(a) could only establish a maximum for the actual number of
square feet of floor space, there being no mention of weighting in the definition.
However, this section refers to § 4.3-which charges the mall level with a greater
burden in paying the common area expenses, without negating its weighting ap-
proach. In order to have this approach carry over to §4.3(a), it would be neces-
sary to show that the parties did not intend "Floor Space" to be capitalized in that
section. The court stated that because of this confusion as to what the parties in-
tended the phrase to mean, the parol evidence rule would not exclude extrinsic
evidence. See instant case at 500, 189 A.2d at 456. However, there is no ambiguity
on the face of § 4.3(a), for that section simply provides a maximum for this tenant's
common area charge. A twenty-five cent maximum for both levels is consistent
with a two-to-one ratio below the maximum. Had the court held the contract clear,
of course, it would not have had to determine the validity of the exclusion clause,
because the evidence would have been inadmissible under the parol evidence rule.
4 See generally 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2405 (3d ed. 1940); Corbin, The Parol
Evidence Rule, 53 YALE L.J. 603, 609-10 (1944).
5 Compare Rolle Mfg. Co. v. Marco Chems., Inc., 92 F. Supp. 218 (D.N.J.
1950), with Komarek v. Cole, 381 P. 2d 773 (Ariz. 1963).
6 See Casriel v. King, 2 N.J. 45, 50, 65 A.2d 514, 516 (1949) (dictum), cited with
approval in Atlantic No. Airlines, Inc. v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J. 293, 302, 96 A.2d
652, 656 (1953). Both courts suggested the ineffectiveness of the parol evidence
rule. But see American Mining Co. v. Himrod-Kimball Mines Co., 124 Colo. 186,
235 P.2d 804 (1951) (dictum).
7 The trial court heard the evidence before deciding whether the lease was
ambiguous. See Joint Appendix, p. 51a, instant case. Compare Rinaudo v. Bloom,
209 Md. 1, 120 A.2d 184 (1956).
8 See, e.g., McIntyre v. Zac-Lac Paint & Lacquer Corp., 131 S.E.2d 640, 643
(Ga. App. 1963) (covenant not to sue) ; Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 441 (1874)
(dictum) (sale of a lobby agent's influence). See generally Kessler, Contracts
of Adhesion--Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLum. L. REv. 629
(1943); Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365 (1921).
9 The adhesion contract is a stereotyped agreement which is drafted unilaterally
by a dominant party and then presented to a weaker party as the only acceptable
contract. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332a (Tent. Draft No. 6,
1960) ; Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 CoLum. L. REV.
1072 (1953) ; Kessler, supra note 8.
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tion; ' 0 the present case concerns the validity of a provision in a negotiated
contract which excludes arguably admissible evidence. 1 Even though the
present contract was negotiated,'12 the court did not inquire whether bargain-
ing had occurred over the clause in question.13 Yet, the clause may have
been used as a bargaining tool by one party who yielded another point in the
negotiations for its inclusion in the lease. In addition, there are legitimate
reasons for excluding evidence of preliminary negotiations. The parties
might have felt that they could negotiate more freely if they knew evidence
of their bargaining would be inadmissible, or they might have wanted to
keep any possible litigation short and inexpensive. If the writing is the only
evidence, the chance of settlement or summary judgment is increased and
the risk of speculation about an unpredictable jury verdict is reduced.
An argument could be made that the present provision is analogous
to construction contract provisions which declare a particular architect's
approval as binding, thereby substituting for the court an expert whose
technical opinion the parties accept.14 Similarly, the New Jersey legislature
has given approval 15 to efforts designed to ease the litigation process by
10 E.g., Modem Woodmen of America v. Angle, 127 Mo. App. 94, 104 S.W. 297
(1907) (waiver of doctor-patient privilege). See generally 1 WIGMoRE, EVIDENcH
§ 7a at 223 (3d ed. 1940) ; Note, 46 HARV. L. REV. 138 passim (1932).
Courts have divided upon the validity of a clause in adhesion contracts which
provides that evidence of payment by guarantor to beneficiary is conclusive proof
of surety's right to indemnity from guarantee, the effect of which was to exclude
the guarantee's evidence in defense. Compare National Sur. Co. v. Fulton, 192
App. Div. 645, 183 N.Y. Supp. 237 (1920), with Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Eickhoff,
63 Minn. 170, 65 N.W. 351 (1895), and Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Davis, 129 Kan.
790, 284 Pac. 430 (1930).
11 See Wood v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 199 Ga. 461, 469, 34 S.E.2d 688, 692 (1945) (re-
fused to speculate if a contractual provision could exclude extrinsic evidence to inter-
pret an ambiguity). Integration or merger clauses are attempts to lend more weight
to the parol evidence rule by placing in the writing a specific intention to integrate
the entire agreement These clauses have been used in jurisdictions where courts
had admitted prior promises, if they determined that the parties had not integrated
their intentions. See Upper Miss. Towing Corp. v. Calmes, 162 F.2d 177 (5th Cir.
1947) ; Silberman v. Crane, 158 Pa. Super. 186, 44 A.2d 598 (1945).
12 Thus, there was no need to protect the interest of a party with limited bar-
gaining power. See, e.g., Fleming v. Merchants Life Ins. Co., 193 Iowa 1164, 188
N.W. 703 (1922) (semble); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Davis, 129 Kan. 790, 284
Pac. 430 (1930) (semble). The significance of an adhesion contract has been
articulated only occasionally. See Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d
Cir. 1948) (action in equity); Ehrenzweig, supra note 9; Kessler, supra note 8;
Note, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 1197, 1205-06 (1963). The significance of a negotiated
contract has been recognized in still fewer decisions. See, e.g., Ballinger Oil Mill,
Inc. v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 37 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1930).
New Jersey has recognized the significance of the adhesion contract See
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (waiver
of implied warranty in auto sales agreement). The present court cited several
insurance cases which invalidated evidentiary provisions. Instant case at 501, 189
A.2d at 457. But these were adhesion contract cases and should not control a nego-
tiated contract situation.
13The exclusionary clause was part of the regular printed lease of the plaintiff-
lessor, so the clause was not added during the negotiations.. See joint Appendix,
p. 64a, instant case.
14 See, e.g., Williams v. Chicago, S.F. & C. Ry., 112 Mo. 463, 20 S.W. 631
(1892).
15 N.J. Rzv. STAT. §§ 2A :24-1 (1952). See 56 COLUaX. L. REv. 902, 903 (1956)
for a compilation of similar statutes from other states.
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providing for the enforcement of contracts that call for private arbitration
instead of judicial litigation.:1 However, the present parties did not seek
to avoid judicial litigation. Once they presented their conflict to the court,
the court had a responsibility to receive relevant evidence unless there was
a substantial ground for refusing to do So.17 Thus, the court stated that
"while plaintiff invokes the jurisdiction of the court ... it would have
us do so wearing judicial blinders." 18
The traditional rules of evidence permit a party to exclude evidence
deemed unreliable or prejudicial, but the evidence will normally be admis-
sible if the party affected fails to object.'9 Therefore, a contractual provi-
sion waiving the right to object to parol evidence might be upheld because
it gives the trier of fact more probative evidence,2 0 and the party has
knowingly and voluntarily yielded his privilege not to have this evidence
16Courts had formerly held these contracts void as an "ouster" of judicial
jurisdiction. Kill v. Hollister, 1 Wils. 129, 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B. 1746); cf.
Christenson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 198 Cal. 685, 247 Pac. 207 (1926); Anderson
v. Odd Fellows Hall, 86 N.J.L. 271, 90 At. 1007 (Sup. Ct. 1914).
-7 See, e.g., Hadley v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 120 F.2d 993 (3d Cir. 1941) ; Ando
v. Woodberry, 8 N.Y.2d 165, 168 N.E.2d 520, 203 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1960). See gen-
erally FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 80:102 (1950); McCoRmicx, EVIDENCE §151
(1954) ; 1 WIGmoRF, EVimENcE § 8c at 283-84 (3d ed. 1940) (criticism of rules
of evidehce which tend to stifle the truth).
18 Instant case at 503, 189 A.2d at 458. This statement echoes Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's dissent in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46, 54 (1948): "[A]
trial is not a game of blind man's buff; and the trial judge . . . need not blindfold
himself by failing to call an available vital witness simply because the parties, for
reasons of trial tactics, chose to withhold his testimony." See Stern & Co. v. State
Loan & Fin. Corp., 205 F. Supp. 702, 709 (D. Del. 1962). See generally Note,
46 HARv. L. REv. 138 (1932).
The present court compared the exclusion of this evidence with the stipulation
of false facts by parties at trial, by citing Swift & Co. v. Hocking Valley R.R., 243
U.S. 281 (1917). In that case, an exhibit to the railroad's complaint to recover
demurrage charges from Swift for keeping their private cars on the railroad's
track clearly stated that title to the track was in the railroad. Swift demurred,
and, for the purposes of reviewing the demurrer, subsequently entered into a stipula-
tion that the track was privately owned by Swift. It was well settled at the time
that a railroad could exact these demurrage charges for cars left on their own
tracks. But a decision on private tracks had not been rendered. The railroad was
obviously willing to enter into such a stipulation to see if it could collect for cars
left on private tracks. A decision on this issue would have been in effect an answer
to a hypothetical question. While affirming the state court's overruling of the
demurrer, the Supreme Court thus declined to consider the issue raised by the
stipulation.
Even with an incomplete presentation of facts, the present case is not a hypo-
thetical case, for the court's decision will result in an enforceable monetary award
against one party on the basis of a real contract. Although the Swift case might
have ended with an enforceable monetary award if the hypothetical facts had been
used, it was plainly secondary to the determination of the legal issue of the col-
lectability of demurrage for private cars left on private tracks. Furthermore, the
stipulation of false facts on the ultimate issue in Swift would lead to a result not
based on the true facts, whereas adherence to the exclusionary clause in the present
case does not present as great a risk that an incorrect result would be reached.
19 See, e.g., Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 184 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1950);
Ideal Bakery v. Schryver, 43 Wyo. 108, 299 Pac. 284 (1931).
20 Compare text accompanying note 10 supra.
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admitted against him.2 1 But since the present agreement excludes other-
wise admissible evidence, the judicial need for information operates against
the provision. Nevertheless, the court should not have held that exclusionary
provisions like the present one necessarily violate public policy. The court's
primary reason for disapproving the present clause was protection of the
judicial process rather than the interest of the complaining party. Respect
for the parties' intentions, however, indicates that such a clause in a nego-
tiated contract should be upheld unless the contractual ambiguity is such
that any decision would only represent judicial guesswork.
Several jurisdictions permit a judge at his discretion to call a witness
the parties have failed to produce, whether through incompetence or trial
tactics.P The judge is "more than a moderator; he is charged to see that
the law is properly administered, and this is a duty which he cannot dis-
charge by remaining inert." 23 In cases like the present, the judicial process
would be sufficiently protected if the court assumed that a negotiated ex-
clusionary provision is valid unless a reading of the contract discloses that
extrinsic evidence is necessary for a decision. The court's standard would
be similar to that used in calling for evidence which the parties at trial
neglected to produce. Under this analysis it is irrelevant whether or not
one of the parties seeks to void the provision, as the defendant did in the
present case. Although this suggestion would make uncertain the status
of the provision, it would usually permit effectuation of the parties' wishes,
except when the needs of the judicial process dictate otherwise.
21 See also Rodenbur v. Kaufmann, 320 F.2d 679 (D.C. Cir. 1963), containing
dictum that "in some cases the parties may before a cause of action arises validly
agree to waive a jury trial . . . ." Id. at 684. However, the court construed
strictly a lease provision waiving jury trial, and held the lessee entitled to a jury
trial in her action against the lessor for damages suffered when the lessee fell in
her apartment hallway.
22 See, e.g., United States v. Browne, 313 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1963) (criminal
action); Stoots v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 857, 66 S.E.2d 866 (1951) (criminal
action). A judge always has discretion to question a witness in either a civil or a
criminal trial in order to prevent an injustice or to reach the truth. See, e.g.,
State v. Chasteen, 228 S.C. 88, 88 S.E.2d 880 (1955). See generally 3 WIGmoRE,
EVIDENCE §784 (3d ed. 1940). The difference between examining witnesses and
calling them is "in degree and not in kind." State v. Home, 171 N.C. 787, 788,
88 S.E. 433 (1916). The fact that most of the reported cases seem to involve
only criminal or equity cases should not prevent this rule's application to all civil
cases. Compare Coulson v. Disborough, [1894] 2 Q.B. 316 (judge could call a
witness without right of cross-examination by the parties), with In re Enoch,
[1910] 1 K.B. 327 (rejects the Coulson rule in a civil dispute), and The King v.
Harris, [1927] 2 K.B. 587 (dictum) (Coulson rule applies only to criminal cases).
See 9 WIGMoRE, EViDENcE §2484 (3d ed. 1940), for a criticism of these last two
cases. Had Coudson allowed cross examination, the objections of the other two courts
might have been overcome, and the discretion of a trial judge to call a witness in
a civil dispute might not be in doubt in England. See generally Wyzanski, A Trial
Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARv. L. Rxv. 1281, 1293-97 (1952); Note,
51 Nw. U. L. REv. 761-63 (1957).
23 United States v. Marzano, 149 F.2d 923, 925 (2d Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.).
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EVIDENCENEWSPAPERMEN NOT REQUIRED To DIVULGE CON-
FIDENTIAL INFORMATION TO INVESTIGATING GRAND JURY EVEN
AFTER INFORMANT'S IDENTITY HAS BEEN VOLUNTARLY DISCLOSED
IN NEWSPAPER ARTICLE
On December 30, 1962, in an article entitled "Fitzpatrick's Secret Talk
to D.A. is Bared," the Philadelphia Sunday Bulletin published a portion
of the secret talk and then stated that much of the District Attorney's ques-
tioning dealt with what Fitzpatrick had already told Bulletin reporters.1
In January 1963, shortly after Fitzpatrick testified before an investigating
grand jury and acknowledged that he had made statements to Bulletin
reporters, the grand jury issued subpoenas duces tecum directing news-
paper officials to produce copies of all statements made to the newspaper
by Fitzpatrick and any other information obtained through the newspaper's
investigations of his activities. 2 When the newspapermen appeared before
the grand jury, they refused to bring in the subpoenaed material even after
the judge excused them from producing the results of newspaper investiga-
tions and copies of documents already in the District Attorney's possession.
8
I Philadelphia Sunday Bulletin, Dec. 30, 1962, p. 1, col. 1; Record, p. 107a, Taylor
and Selby Appeals, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963).
The Bulletin became involved in this case when Fitzpatrick went to it because
he "felt it better to have a newspaper going for . . . [him] when . . . [he came]
in." Record, p. 114a. The newspaper was apparently interested in the thorough
investigation of alleged criminal conduct and corruption in the legislative and executive
branches of the City of Philadelphia, in the Zoning Board of Adjustment, and in the
Department of Licenses and Inspection. It is interesting to note that from this
highly publicized grand jury investigation, with all its political undertones, two
reporters were the first to be charged with unlawful conduct.
2 The subpoena directed Selby and Taylor to bring (a) all tape recordings,
written statements, memoranda of interviews, conversations, conferences had with
John Fitzpatrick; (b) all copies of statements given by John Fitzpatrick to the
District Attorney on February 20, 1962, portions of which appeared in the Philadelphia
Sulday Bulletin on December 30, 1962; (c) all tape recordings of conferences,
interviews, discussions, interrogations, or conversations with John Fitzpatrick; (d)
all memoranda, notes, reports, and other documents of or pertaining to conferences,
interviews, discussions, interrogations, or conversations with John Fitzpatrick; (e) all
memoranda, notes, reports, and other documents of or pertaining to investigations
conducted as a result of information furnished by John Fitzpatrick; (f) all records
of expenses incurred directly or indirectly in gathering information from, or con-
ducting conferences, investigations, discussions, interrogations, or conversations with
John Fitzpatrick; (g) all documents of or pertaining to the examination of John
Fitzpatrick by polygraph examiners, physicians, psychologists, or other experts.
Instant case at 35, 193 A.2d at 182; Record, pp. 2a-5a.
3 The trial court held that (1) appellants were not required to produce an alleged
copy of statements made by Fitzpatrick to the District Attorney's office on February
20, 1962, and set forth in the Bulletin on December 30, 1962, since the result might
be to disclose the identity of the transmitter of the alleged copy to the Bulletin;
(2) appellants were not required to produce memoranda, notes, reports, and other
documents of or pertaining to investigations conducted by the Bulletin as a result of
information furnished by Fitzpatrick, since such investigations would doubtless en-
compass confidential interviews with other persons who would give information only
if their identity was kept secret; (3) appellants were not required to produce the
results of alleged polygraph tests given to Fitzpatrick since they would reveal the
identity of the experts who conducted the tests; (4) but appellants were required to
produce documents and tape recordings allegedly evidencing what John Fitzpatrick
had told Bulletin reporters, since with respect to such materials the Bulletin, by
publishing in its December 30, 1962, edition the single sentence, "However, much of
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Despite their claim of privilege, the newspapermen were convicted of
contempt. But in reliance on a Pennsylvania statute protecting confidential
communications to newspaper reporters,4 the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania reversed the convictions.6 Taylor and Selby Appeals, 412 Pa. 32, 193
A.2d 181 (1963).
The power to compel a witness to testify is necessitated by the public
interest in a judicial system that encourages disclosure of information
relevant to the just determination of the case before the court., The grant
of a privilege is an exception to this general legal philosophy. At common
law, newspapermen were not afforded the privilege of withholding the
source of their information.7 Yet, for newspapers to be effective they
must have great freedom in gathering as well as in publishing 8 and dis-
tributing news.9 The first newspaper privilege statute was passed in Mary-
land in 1896 ;1o eleven other states now have similar statutes.". In enacting
these statutes, the legislatures decided that in at least some circumstances
protection of the informant-reporter relationship was more important to the
the subsequent questioning dealt with what John Fitzpatrick had told Bulletin re-
porters," had waived its privilege; (5) appellants were required to answer certain
questions concerning such materials. Instant case at 37-38, 193 A.2d at 183; Record,
pp. 132a-33a.
4 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 330 (a) (Supp. 1962).
No person, engaged on, connected with, or employed by any newspaper of
general circulation as defined by the laws of this Commonwealth, or any
press association, or any radio or television station, for the purpose of
gathering, procuring, compiling, editing or publishing news, shall be required
to disclose the source of any information procured or obtained by such per-
son, in any legal proceeding, trial or investigation before any court, grand
jury, traverse or petit jury, or any officer thereof, before the General Assem-
bly or any committee thereof, before any commission, department, or bureau
of this Commonwealth, or before any county or municipal body, officer or
committee thereof.
5 Mr. Justice Cohen dissented.
6 Cf. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 549 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910
(1958).
7 See, e.g., Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910
(1958) ; Ex parte Lawrence, 116 Cal. 298, 48 Pac. 124 (1897); Clein v. State, 52
So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1950) ; In re Grunow, 84 N.J.L. 235, 85 Atl. 1011 (Sup. Ct. 1913) ;
People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936). For a more
complete history of the development of privileged communication in this area see
Note, 36 VA. L. REv. 61 (1950) ; Note, 35 NEB. L. Rxv. 562 (1956) ; 8 BuFFALo L.
REv. 294 (1959). In the face of this authority, two county courts nevertheless have
held that newspapermen have the privilege of withholding the source of their infor-
mation under common law. Nat Caldwell (unreported), Anderson County Ct., Tenn.,
NEw YORK LAW REvisioN CoMMIssioN. Leg. Doc. No. 65(A), pp. 63-64 (1949);
T. Norman Palmer (unreported), Queens County Ct., N.Y., Editor & Publisher,
Aug. 24, 1935, p. 6.
8 See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
9 See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) ; cf. Marsh v. Ala-
bama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
' Note, 36 VA. L. Rv. 61 (1950); Md. Laws, 1896, ch. 249, at 437 (now MD.
ANN. CODE art. 35, § 2 (1957)).
1 1 ALA. CODE tit 7, § 370 (1958) ; ARIz. RET. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (Supp. 1962);
ARE:. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (Supp. 1961); CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 1881(6); IND.
ANN. STAT. § 2-1733 (Supp. 1963); Ky. REv. STAT. § 421.100 (1962); MIcHr. STAT.
ANN. § 28.945(1) (1954); MONT. REv. CODEs ANN. § 93-601-2 (Supp. 1961); NJ.
STAT. ANN. §2A:84A-21 (Supp. 1962); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2739-12 (Page
1954) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 330 (Supp. 1962).
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public interest than the possible disclosure of alleged criminal activities.
Courts have generally construed these statutes narrowly,'2 but the supreme
court's broad language that this statute "has placed the gathering and the
protection of the source of news as of greater importance to the public
interest . . . than the disclosure of the alleged crime," 13 indicates that
in Pennsylvania the former interest will be protected whenever there is a
clash. This approach ignores the possibility that a slight difference in facts
may rationally call for a different result.
When it granted a privilege to newspapermen, the legislature was
concerned with the usual case in which an informant makes disclosures
under the stipulation that his identity remain unknown.14 There was prob-
ably a fear that if a newspaper were forced under the pressure of a contempt
conviction to divulge the source or content of previously confidential in-
formation, members of the general public might suspect that the disclosure
was made contrary to the wishes of the newspaper's informant. This sus-
picion could undermine the newspaper's image as a shield for those wishing
to divulge socially desirable information without disclosing their identity.1
5
In the present case, however, the informant's identity was voluntarily dis-
closed before the state exercised any coercive power. Since newspapermen
have consistently adhered to their code of ethics which prohibits the iden-
tification of informants desiring anonymity, 16 the public probably presumed
that the original disclosure was made with the informant's permission. The
newspaper could reduce the risk of discouraging potential informants by
publishing a clear statement that the informant was willing, and even de-
sired, that his name and the information be disclosed. A statement showing
that the informant would benefit by the disclosure, as was true in the present
case, 17 should eradicate doubts concerning the newspaper's fidelity.'
8 Ad-
12 See Brogan v. Passaic Daily News, 22 N.J. 139, 123 A.2d 473 (1956) ; In re
Howard, 136 Cal. App. 2d 816, 289 P.2d 537 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955).
In State v. Donovan, 129 N.J.L. 478, 487, 30 A.2d 421, 426 (Sup. Ct. 1943), the
court stated that "the inquiry in the case before us goes not to the source, but to the
messenger by whom the article was taken . . . . No reason . . . appears why the
vehicle of transmission should not be revealed." The vehicle of transmission in
Donovan was the messenger who brought the information from an informer to the
newspaper. In the present case the trial court, by modifying the subpoena, specifically
protected, inter alia, against revelation of the transmitter of the information. See
note 4 supra.
13 Instant case at 42, 193 A.2d at 186. (Emphasis deleted.)
14 In nearly all the cases which have arisen involving the newspaperman's privi-
lege, the fact situation was that of a newspaperman refusing to reveal the identity
of an informant. See, e.g., cases cited note 7 supra.
15 But see Carter, The Journalist, His Informant and Testimonial Privilege, 35
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1111, 1124 (1960).
16 For a complete discussion of the Journalists' Code of Ethics see 36 VA. L. REv.
61, 69-75 (1950). For a compilation of unreported cases which resulted in the con-
viction of newspapermen for contempt see id. at 71-74.
17 Since Fitzpatrick had already testified, the disclosure of the information by the
newspaper would help establish his credibility. Fitzpatrick was thought to be in-
volved in the area being investigated and, therefore, cooperation with the grand jury
would be to his advantage. In fact, Fitzpatrick actually stated to the grand jury that
"he would have no objection, should the jury desire, to the tape recordings . . .
being submitted to the jury if they could be secured." Record, p. 114a.
18 See also Carter, supra note 15.
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mittedly, even if these steps are taken, general knowledge that the news-
paper's right to withhold information is not inviolable may somewhat reduce
the total accumulation of information by newspapers, but this possibility is
not sufficient to justify the loss of relevant evidence by a broad prophylactic
rule.
One of the most disputed issues in the instant case was the interpreta-
tion of the phrase "source of information"-whether it included not only
the person who gave the information, but also the tape recordings, docu-
ments, and other written material which the newspaper allegedly possessed.
The court held that " 'source' means not only the identity of the person, but
likewise includes documents, inanimate objects and all other sources of
information." 19
If the legislature intended to include the information itself, it could
have used "information," as it did in the statute creating the physician-
patient privilege,2 0 or the words "confidential communication," as it did in
the attorney-client privilege 21 statute.2 2  The newspaper contended that a
broad interpretation of the statute was proper because the documents them-
selves might reveal the person who surrendered them or might disclose the
names of other individuals who qualified for protection.P The first argu-
ment was inapplicable in the present case since the informant's identity was
already known. In addition, the strength of the second objection was
minimized by the trial judge's offer to allow the newspaper to delete from
the documents all statements which might disclose the identity of other
19 Instant case at 40, 193 A.2d at 185. (Emphasis deleted.) The court relied
on the "words and phrases" section of the Statutory Construction Act, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 46, § 533 (1952), which states, "Words and phrases shall be construed
according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage
.... " and when faced with the problem of discovering the "common and approved
usage," the courts in Pennsylvania have turned to the definitions contained in standard
dictionaries. See, e.g., Otto Milk Co. v. Washington City, 363 Pa. 243, 69 A.2d 399
(1949) ; Coverdale Appeal, 188 Pa. Super. 587, 149 A.2d 573 (1959).
20 No person authorized to practice physics or surgery shall be allowed, in
any civil case, to disclose any inforination which he acquired in attending the
patient in a professional capacity, and which was necessary to enable him to
act in that capacity, which shall tend to blacken the character of the patient,
without consent of said patient, except in civil cases, brought by such patient,
for damages on account of personal injuries.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 328 (1958). (Emphasis added.) The wording of this act
has remained unchanged since it was passed in 1907.
21 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 321 (1958). The attorney is not "competent or per-
mitted to testify to confidential communications made to him by his client or the
client be compelled to disclose the same, unless in either case this privilege be waived
upon the trial by the client." (Emphasis added.) The wording of this act has
remained unchanged since it was passed in 1887.
22 However, the newspaper privilege statute, unlike the other privileged com-
munication statutes, has as its primary focus the protection of the identity of the
informant and not the information itself. The language of the statute probably was
selected with the idea that the information would all be published in the newspaper,
so that the identity of the informant would be the only issue. Thus, when determining
the scope of the privilege in a case in which all the information had not been published,
the policy reasons behind the statute should be considered.
23Brief for Appellants, pp. 15-16, Taylor and Selby Appeals, 412 Pa. 32, 193
A.2d 181 (1963).
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informants.2 4 While it may be impractical to give this power to the sub-
poenaed party, the censorial function may be performed by the court.2 5
"Source of information" may include documents in a particular case, but to
interpret it as including all documents denies the court the opportunity to
evaluate, by inspection of the documents as well as by the other facts in the
case, whether there is a threat to the newspaper-informant relationship.
The newspaper may waive the privilege by divulging the informant's
name or the information itself; the statute merely states that a newspaper-
man cannot be forced to divulge his sources.2 6 The lower court in the
present case held that the newspaper had waived its privilege of nondis-
closure by a statement in the December 30, 1962, article that, "much of the
subsequent questioning dealt with what John Fitzpatrick had told Bulletin
reporters." 27 This rule subjects to subpoena all information communicated
to a newspaper by an informant whose identity has been revealed. If the
rule were literally applied, the result would be that when an informant gave
both confidential and nonconfidential information, the newspaper, by dis-
closing his identity, would have waived the privilege with regard to all the
24 The supreme court stated that "if a court can select or direct newsmen in its
or their judgment to select or delete what information is disclosed by the informer
or to furnish the documents in full with only the names deleted . . . the purpose,
the object and the intent of the Act will be realistically nullified." Instant case at
43-44, 193 A.2d at 186. This conclusion would seem to be based on the assumption
that the documents are protected and that any forced production of the same would
violate the act. This does not help in determining why the documents need be pro-
tected to effectuate the purpose of the act.
The issue of whether an informant's sources are protected, if identified in the
documents, was not specifically presented in the instant case. It would appear that Judge
Kelley would protect these indirect informants as his order specifically protected the
identity of all nondisclosed informants. See note 4 supra.25 Cf. United States v. Hernandez, 290 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1961) ; United States v.
Spangelet, 258 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1958). See generally Note, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 1154,
1183-84 (1962).
Although in camera inspection in regard to subpoenaed material has not been
widely used in Pennsylvania, the control that a court has over an investigating grand
jury suggests that it is within the court's inherent power. It is only through the
supervising court that the grand jury is able to subpoena any witness. The scope
of all grand jury investigations is limited by the charge of the presiding judge.
McNair's Petition, 324 Pa. 48, 58, 187 Atl. 498, 503 (1936) (dictum). It has been
established in Pennsylvania that in criminal cases the court has the discretion to grant
to the defendant discovery of items in the prosecution's case. See Commonwealth v.
Gockley, 411 Pa. 437, 192 A.2d 693 (1963); Petition of Dijoseph, 394 Pa. 19, 145
A.2d 187 (1958) (per curiam) ; Commonwealth v. Wable, 382 Pa. 80, 114 A.2d 334
(1955).
There is a problem with using in camera inspection in connection with an investi-
gation of political corruption, as illustrated by the withdrawal of the original judge
in the present case. See generally Petition for Disqualification, In the Matter of
Taylor and Selby, Philadelphia Ct. of Quarter Sess., April 10, 1963. An alternative
is to allow the newspaper itself to be the censor, as was done by the trial court in
the instant case; the success of this technique will depend on the newspaper's good
faith.
26 To allow disclosure by the newspaper is consistent with the purpose as well as
the language of the act. When the newspaper has decided that the public interest in
obtaining the evidence is more important than its own interest in withholding the
information, this decision should be respected since the newspaper is in the best posi-
tion to make such a determination. This situation will rarely occur because news-
papermen have adhered consistently to their code of ethics. See note 18 supra and
accompanying text.
27 Instant case at 38, 193 A.2d at 183.
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information.28 This would impair the newspaper's relationship with per-
sons who provide information regularly. At the other extreme, the supreme
court, consistently with its broad interpretation of "source of information,"
held that the newspaper's waiver extended only to the information actually
published.2 Under the supreme court's rule, the sole function of the sub-
poena duces tecum would be to aid in determining the credibility of a wit-
ness, rather than to acquire information. This rule unnecessarily impairs
the investigating function of the grand jury. In the present case, the
supreme court could have concluded that there was no waiver on the ground
that the newspaper's statement revealed only that Fitzpatrick had com-
municated with the Bulletin; it made no reference to the substance of the
communication. When the newspaper has disclosed the informant's identity
and the general subject matter of his communication-for example, that X
has informed the newspaper of abuses in fee collection by the Department
of Licenses and Inspection-there is no reason to require verbatim publica-
tion as a prerequisite to grand jury access to the details of the communica-
tion. In camera inspection can be used to limit to the particular subject
the information which the newspaper is required to produce.
When the identity of the informant has not been disclosed by the news-
paper, but the informant testifies before a grand jury or other official agency,
the public interest is best served by requiring the newspaper to produce or
disclose the contents of documents which the informant had given to it. If
"source of information" is interpreted to mean only the identity of the
informant, it is apparent that once the identity has been revealed to the
grand jury, the newspaper cannot be said to be "disclosing" its source of
information; thus, there should be no privilege to resist a subpoena. When
"source of information" is interpreted to include the information itself, the
courts similarly should deny the newspaper the privilege of nondisclosure
when the informant's identity is known and he desires that the newspaper
produce the information which he had provided.
Under a broad interpretation of "source of information," when a grand
jury subpoenas an informant who invokes the privilege against self-incrim-
ination, the reasons for denying the newspaper's privilege as to information
not yet disclosed are not present 3 0 The invocation of the privilege against
28 The lower court's written opinion suggests that the court's disposition of the
waiver issue was based solely on the statement printed in the newspaper. However,
it is suggested that the other peculiar circumstances in the case-the disclosure of
Fitzpatrick's identity and Fitzpatrick's announced willingness to have the documents
produced-may have influenced the court. Although the court cited a New Jersey
case, Brogan v. Passaic Daily News, 22 N.J. 139, 123 A.2d 473 (1956), holding that
the privilege belongs to the newspaper, the court may have viewed Fitzpatrick's
statement as undermining the reason for the privilege. See generally Carter, supra
note 15.2 9 Instant case at 44, 193 A.2d at 186.
3o If the informant is granted immunity from prosecution, he cannot refuse to
testify, since the privilege exists only when the claimant has a reasonable fear of
criminal prosecution. E.g., Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951). Once the
informant has told the grand jury the information he had reported to the newspaper,
the newspaper can be compelled to produce copies of the information, since they will
not be "disclosing" it. In camera inspection will be appropriate here to limit the
subpoena to the information disclosed by the informant.
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self-incrimination makes plain to potential informants that disclosure by the
newspaper is against the informant's wishes. Thus, the purpose of the
statute-protection of the newspaper-informant relationship-would be
violated by disclosure.
JURIES-Two RECENT CASES PRESENT ISSUE OF POSSIBLE 0o1
LECTIVE JURY PREJuDIOE ALTHOUGH EACH JUROR QUALIFIED
IND=rVDUALLY
Within a nine day period three factually similar murders occurred in
Suffolk County, New York. All the crimes received sensational newspaper
publicity proclaiming the presence of a "mad killer" in the county. The
defendant Bloeth's arrest, announced confession, and psychiatric examina-
tion intensified the press coverage for about three weeks, as prosecution-
"Bloeth Must Go To Chair"-and defense-" [He is] . . as mad as a
hatter"-vied for news space. Following six months of relative quiet in the
press, a poll taken by the defense attorney showed that almost all of 210
persons interviewed in Suffolk County knew of the confession and thought
the defendant guilty, and more than half thought he could not receive a fair
trial in the county.' At trial,2 two months after the poll, 3 a defense motion
for a change of venue was denied. Fifteen of the sixteen regular and alter-
nate jurors selected had read of the case; eight had formed opinions of the
defendant's guilt, but said they could set them aside and render an impartial
verdict. The defendant's death sentence for first degree murder was
affirmed by the state courts, but on habeas corpus the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit granted relief, holding that the jury was so partial as
to deprive the defendant of due process. United States ex rel. Bloeth v.
Denno, 313 F.2d 364 (2d Cir.) (6-to-3 decision), cert. denied, 372 U.S.
978 (1963).
Another defendant, charged with federal narcotics violations, encoun-
tered a jury panel of forty-four members, forty-three of whom had voted to
convict in at least one of eight recent unconnected narcotics convictions.4
1 The responses of the thirty-eight prospective jurors dismissed after inter-
rogation on the voir dire are additional evidence of community sentiment. All but
two had heard of the case, and thirty-one had formed an opinion about the defend-
ant's guilt. United States ex rel. Bloeth v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364, 368-69 (2d Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963).
2 The only issue seriously litigated was insanity, a fact which the dissent stressed
in contending that the publicity could not have prejudiced the jurors' decision. See
313 F.2d at 376-78. The majority, however, pointed out that much of the publicity
denigrated the insanity defense. Id. at 373.
S The dissent contended that, eight months after the objectionable publicity, the
prejudice could not be great enough to warrant a new trial. Id. at 375. The
majority, however, concluded that the voir dire demonstrated the contrary. Id.
at 373.
4 As the court's opinion says, "the general rule is that a juror is not disqualified
to sit in a criminal case because he previously sat on a similar case arising out of a
separate, distinct, and independent transaction." Casias v. United States, 315 F.2d
614, 615 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 845 (1963); see Annot., 160
A.L.R. 753, 762-65 (1946).
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Each of these convictions involved two or more of the government witnesses
who ultimately testified at this defendant's trial.5 The jury eventually
selected contained eleven members who had served in at least one of the
previous cases.6 The defendant's objections to the panel were overruled,
and he was convicted. An equally divided Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit affirmed, rejecting the defendant's contention that the jury was not
impartial. Casias v. United States, 315 F.2d 614 (10th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 374 U.S. 845 (1963).
Events which may affect a potential juror's objective appraisal of the
evidence may assume various forms. The juror may have specific knowl-
edge of inadmissible facts, such as the defendant's prior criminal record,
or he may have a general predisposition toward the outcome of the trial,
caused by such influences as press publicity or personal friendship. The
present cases are concerned with the attempt to obtain a jury which, when
initially seated, is free from either category of bias.
In order to have their convictions set aside, defendants alleging that
they were tried by juries which did not meet sixth or fourteeth amendment
impartiality standards 7 have generally had to show that a particular juror
was actually prejudiced.8 The juror's admission on voir dire that he has
formed an opinion about the defendant's guilt does not necessarily disqualify
5 The state courts conflict on whether a juror who already sat on similar cases
arising out of different transactions with some of the same prosecution witnesses
is disqualified. Compare State v. Conner, 59 Idaho 695, 89 P.2d 197 (1939), and
Ladner v. State, 148 Miss. 243, 114 So. 341 (1927), and State v. Russell, 73 Mont.
240, 235 Pac. 712 (1925), with Priestly v. State, 19 Ariz. 371, 171 Pac. 137 (1918),
and Roberts v. State, 4 Ga. App. 378, 61 S.E. 497 (1908), and Hardgraves v. State,
61 Tex. Crim. 422, 135 S.W. 144 (1911). Apparently no federal court, however,
has reversed a conviction rendered by a jury including such a juror. 315 F.2d at
615-17; see Annot., 160 A.L.R. 753, 767-70 (1946).
6 One of the jurors had sat on three juries which had rendered narcotics con-
victions, four had served twice, and six had served once. 315 F.2d at 614. One
had even voted to convict the defendant's brother in a similar case. Brief for Appel-
lant, p. 3.
7 1t is difficult to determine whether the standard applied in the federal courts
under the sixth amendment has differed from that in reviewing state courts under
the due process clause of the fourteenth. Judges often say that they will be stricter
in reviewing federal decisions. E.g., Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 728-29
(1963) (Clark, J., dissenting). In so stating, however, they customarily make
reference to the Supreme Court's supervisory power over the federal court system.
E.g., ibid. A comparison of decisions fails to reveal whether even this power has
actually been given greater scope than the constitutional doctrine, although the
only two convictions upset by the federal courts on grounds of jury prejudice
until recent years were both federal trials. Juelich v. United States, 214 F.2d 950
(5th Cir. 1954) ; Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952). The lack
of clearer definition of the difference between the standards may result from the
great leeway the federal standard itself has allowed to the trial judge. See note 10
infra and accompanying text.
8 See Buchalter v. New York, 319 U.S. 427, 430 (1943) ; Holt v. United States,
218 U.S. 245, 251 (1910) ; Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131, 168-80 (1887) ; Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 157 (1879). But see Juelich v. United States, mipra
note 7; Delaney v. United States, supra note 7.
Without requiring a showing of actual bias, however, the federal courts have
overturned convictions by juries selected improperly, e.g., Shepherd v. Florida, 341
U.S. 50 (1951), or dominated by mobs, e.g., Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923)
(per curiam).
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him; the defendant must show that the juror could not set the opinion aside
and decide the case solely on the evidenceY Furthermore, because of the
trail judge's superior opportunity to assess the community atmosphere sur-
rounding the trial and the prospective jurors' demeanors on voir dire,
federal courts have left the trial judge wide discretion in ruling on motions
relevant to the jurors' impartiality.10 Nevertheless, the courts have recog-
nized under the common law that sometimes a juror cannot be relied upon
to testify to his own impartiality. Thus, persons who have previously sat
as jurors in the same cause," those closely related to one of the parties,'2
and persons with a financial interest in the outcome of the case 13 are auto-
matically disqualified as having an "implied bias," "because in general per-
sons in a similar situation would feel prejudice." 14
0 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1961) (dictum); see, e.g., Holt v.
United States, supra note 8, at 248; Spies v. Illinois, supra note 8, at 170-80; Rey-
nolds v. United States, supra note 8, at 155-57; Note, 60 CoLumf. L. Rzv. 349, 357-58
(1960); Note, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1278, 1286-87 (1959). Some courts have indi-
cated that a juror who has expressed an opinion may be disqualified even though
he says he can render an impartial verdict. E.g., United States v. Wallace, 201
F.2d 65, 67 (10th Cir. 1952); United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 49, 51 (No.
14692g) (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (Marshall, C.J.). No federal court appears to have
reversed a conviction on this ground, however. In fact, the Supreme Court has
affirmed convictions in at least two cases in which a juror had expressed an opinion.
Spies v. Illinois, supra note 8; Reynolds v. United States, m.pra note 8.
.0 Note, 60 CoLum. L. REv. 349, 353 (1960); see Holt v. United States, mspra
note 8, at 248; Reynolds v. United States, supra note 8, at 156; Rideau v. Louisiana,
373 U.S. 723, 733 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting); Irvin v. Dowd, supra note 9, at
723-24 (dictum); Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 115 (1st Cir. 1952)
(dictum) (the courts have "possibly . . . overstrained the point").
Recent cases indicate, however, that the trial judge's discretion may no longer
be so wide. See Rideau v. Louisiana, supra (by implication) ; cf. Marshall v. United
States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959) (per curiam) (reversal based upon supervisory power
over federal courts).
"United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 49, 50 (No. 14692g) (C.C.D. Va. 1807)
(dictum) (Marshall, C.J.) ; Casias v. United States, 315 F.2d 614, 620 (10th Cir.)
(en banc) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 845 (1963); cf. Note, 60
COLmJm. L. Rav. 349, 356 n.36 (1960).
12 Miller v. United States, 38 App. D.C. 361, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1912) (dictum);
authorities cited note 11 mpra; see Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 181-82
(1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
13 Miller v. United States, 38 App. D.C. 361 (D.C. Cir. 1912) ; Casias v. United
States, 315 F.2d 614, 620 (10th Cir.) (en banc) (dissenting opinion), cert. denlied,
374 U.S. 845 (1963) ; Note, 60 CoLum. L. Ray. 349, 356 n.36 (1960) ; see Dennis v.
United States, supra note 12, at 181-82 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ; cf. Tumey
v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
'4 United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 49, 50 (No. 14692g) (C.C.D. Va. 1807)
(Marshall, C.J.) ; accord, authorities cited note 13 supra.
The judgment that a court must . . . exercise in finding "disqualification
for bias" of persons who belong to a particular class is a psychological
judgment...
The reason for disqualifying a whole class on the ground of bias is the
law's recognition that if the circumstances of that class in the run of in-
stances are likely to generate bias, consciously or unconsciously, it would
be a hopeless endeavor to search out the impact of these circumstances on
the mind and judgment of a particular individual. . . . Law as a response
to life recognizes the operation of such influences even though not consciously
or clearly entertained.
Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 181-82 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
However, the federal courts have refused, in Prohibition Act cases, to apply
this doctrine to prospective jurors who were members of an anti-saloon league. E.g.,
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In the recent case of Irvin v. Dowd,15 on which Bloeth was based, the
Supreme Court set aside a state conviction because the jury was not im-
partial when seated, even though each juror had testified that he could
render a verdict based solely upon the evidence. This decision seems based
in part upon an extension of the "implied bias" principle, since it stressed
the sensational publicity up to the time of trial,16 the community feeling
shown by newspaper reports, and the admissions by eighty-eight percent of
the prospective jurors questioned on voir dire that they thought the defend-
Remus v. United States, 291 Fed. 501, 507-10 (6th Cir. 1923), cert. denied, 263 U.S.
717 (1924). They have also refused to exclude policemen, Cavness v. United States,
187 F.2d 719 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951), friends of the prosecutor,
Roberson v. United States, 249 F.2d 737, 740 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
919 (1958), fellow employees of a government witness, United States v. Sferas, 210
F.2d 69, 75 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 935 (1954), or those who have sat as
jurors in prosecutions under the same statute, even with some of the same prose-
cution witnesses, see notes 4-5 supra. The Supreme Court applied the common-law
doctrine to disqualify government employees in federal prosecutions, Crawford v.
United States, 212 U.S. 183 (1909), but held constitutional D.C. CoDE ANN. § 11-1420
(1961), providing, with some exceptions, that government employees in the District
of Columbia are qualified, United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123 (1936).
15 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (habeas corpus).
Id. at 725-26. Compare United States ex rel. Bloeth v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364,
366-67 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963). The nature and
extent of the publicity is relevant in determining the strength of the jurors' opinions.
The courts have generally considered six factors in assessing the publicity's likely
impact on the jurors, see Gelb, Fair Trials and Free Speech, 31 GEo. WASH. L. Rv.
607, 615-16 (1963); cf. United States v. Bonanno, 177 F. Supp. 106, 122 (S.D.N.Y.
1959) (Kaufman, J.), rev'd on other grounds sub norn. United States v. Bufalino,
285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960); Note, 60 CoLum. L. Ray. 349, 363-65 (1960): its
emotionalism, see Geagan v. Gavin, 292 F.2d 244, 247 (1st Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 903 (1962), extent and frequency of circulation, see Beck v. Washington,
369 U.S. 541, 556 (1962), apparent reliability and credibility to the reader, cf. Note,
60 CoLum. L. Ray. 349, 357-58, 365 (1960), timing with regard to the trial, see ibid.;
Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 192-93, 195 (1952); Wolfe v. Nash, 313 F.2d
393, 397-98 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 817 (1963), content of matter inad-
missable at trial, cf. Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959) (per curiam),
and official encouragement, if any, see Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 113-14
(1st Cir. 1952). The logical relevance of this last factor to the impartial jury ques-
tion is doubtful. The effect on the defendant is the same whoever causes the publicity,
cf. United States v. Florio, 13 F.R.D. 296, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (Kaufman, J.),
except when the government's participation has increased the apparent reliability of
the information published. These cases may reflect prophylactic considerations, to
prevent such behavior by officials, or a belief that the trial is more unfair, even
though the jury may not be less impartial, where the official conduct has caused the
potential prejudice. See Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 201-02 (1952) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting) ; ef. Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507, 513-15 (2d Cir. 1961)
(Friendly, J.).
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963), presents an extension of the "implied
bias" principle to extreme prejudicial pretrial publicity. Without even examining the
record of the voir dire to determine whether any jurors were actually biased, the
Court reversed a state murder conviction rendered after a film of the defendant
confessing had been shown three times on television. Although only three jurors
had seen the telecasts, the Court labeled them "kangaroo court proceedings," and
stated that "this spectacle . . . in a very real sense was Rideau's trial . . . . Any
subsequent court proceedings in a community so pervasively exposed to such a
spectacle could be but a hollow formality." Id. at 726. The number of tainted jurors
thus seems irrelevant in Rideau. But cf. Bearden v. United States, 320 F.2d 99 (5th
Cir. 1963) (televised showing of chase and arrest of the defendant, coupled with
trial judge's denial of change of venue, held not to constitute ground for reversal;
Ridean distinguished as concerning confession).
448 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.112
ant guilty.17 The Court also emphasized, however, that eight of the jurors
admitted having formed opinions of the defendant's guilt.' Neither Irvin
nor Bloeth indicates that publicity and community feeling alone would cause
the conviction to be overturned.' 9 In similar situations, therefore, the
existence of only one or two jurors who have formed opinions may be
insufficient to show the jury to be biased.20
A court might distinguish between a jury with six or eight jurors
who have formed opinions and a jury with one or two on the basis that,
although there is a risk that any juror who already has an opinion may be
unable to set it aside, the risk is so small that an individual juror should not
automatically be disqualified. When the jury includes six or eight such
jurors, however, the likelihood that at least one of them cannot ignore his
opinion becomes much greater. Therefore, the conviction might be reversed
because at least one juror was probably prejudiced, although the court can-
not tell which one. A court might also reason that the individual juror
with a previously-formed opinion is actually likely to be able to set it aside
if he is the only such member of the jury, but the interaction and mutual
support among a significant number of opinion-holding jurors may be such
as to intensify their opinions so that they cannot remain impartial.21 A
third distinction might rest on a conclusion that although a juror is unlikely
17366 U.S. at 726-27. Compare United States ex rel. Bloeth v. Denno, supra
note 16, at 367-69; Geagan v. Gavin, supra note 16.
18 366 U.S. at 728. Compare United States ex rel. Bloeth v. Denno, supra note
16, at 367-68, 372-73.
1a Mr. Justice Clark's opinion for the Court in Irvin seems to find the jurors
actually biased, see 366 U.S. at 723-24, a finding which must be based on the jurors'
admissions of opinion. This impression is strengthened by his dissent in Rideau v.
Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 730-33 (1963), note 16 supra, which distinguished Irvin,
emphasizing the lack of showing that any of Rideau's jurors held opinions. Further-
more, the Court did not cite Irvin. The courts seem uniformly to have required that
some of the jurors admit opinions before finding Irvin applicable. See, e.g., Beck v.
Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 556-58 (1962); Bearden v. United States, 320 F.2d 99,
102-03 (5th Cir. 1963) (dictum) ; Wolfe v. Nash, 313 F.2d 393, 398 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 374 U.S. 817 (1963). See generally Gelb, vepra note 16, at 616, 618.
20 Both Irvin and Bloeth stressed the fact that a substantial number of jurors
admitted opinions. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 727-28 (1961) ; United States ex rel.
Bloeth v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364, 367-68, 372 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 978 (1963). At least two cases have distinguished Irvin as involving more
jurors who held opinions. Dennis v. United States, 302 F.2d 5, 8 (10th Cir. 1962) ;
Geagan v. Gavin, 292 F.2d 244 (1st Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 903 (1962).
Juelich v. United States, 214 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1954), seems to have been based on
similar considerations, since the court distinguished cases stating the traditional rule,
see notes 8-9 supra and accompanying text, only on the ground that all twelve jurors
admitted having formed opinions.
Irvin and Bloeth seem to conflict to some extent with Frazier v. United States,
335 U.S. 497 (1948) (5-to-4 decision), in which the Court affirmed a conviction
despite the fact that all twelve jurors were government employees. Mr. Justice
Rutledge, writing for the Court, noted that defense counsel himself had eliminated
by peremptory challenge all the privately employed members of the panel, id. at 505-07,
but also suggested that, since government employees were qualified as individuals,
the number of them on the jury was not important, id. at 510-11. Mr. Justice Jack-
son's vigorous dissent rejected the argument. Id. at 514-20.
21 Cf. Blumer, The Crowd, the Public, and the Mass, in THE PROCESS AND
EFFECTS OF MASS COMMUNICATION, 363, 364 (Schramm ed. 1955); HILGA, INTRO-
DUcTION TO PsYcHoLoGY 556 (3d ed. 1962).
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to disregard totally his previously formed opinion,22 the prejudice to the
defendant from having one or two such jurors is outweighed by the difficulty
in forming a jury from a community subjected to intensive publicity.
2 3
When a significantly greater number of jurors have formed opinions, how-
ever, the number of jurors who can give the defendant the full benefit of the
presumption of innocence is reduced to such a degree that the defendant's
right to an impartial trial may become determinative.
These distinctions apply only when the bias is one of general attitude
toward the trial or someone connected with it. When the alleged bias
results solely because some jurors knew specific inadmissible facts, the num-
ber of jurors tainted is often irrelevant because it is likely that they dis-
closed these facts to the rest of the jury. Occurrences at the trial itself
also should be assumed to have biased all of the jurors or none.
While Irvin and Bloeth did not enunciate any of these rationales, or
adopt a statistical analysis, the courts apparently considered the number of
jurors involved as well as the apparent strength of the individuals' opinions.
In Casias, half of the Tenth Circuit rejected the distinction based upon the
number of jurors. Judge Lewis, voting to affirm the conviction, best stated
their position:
To hold that not one of the individual jurors was here disqualified
for cause under long established rules but that the collective jury
was impliedly prejudiced because of the totality of circumstance is
but a denial of the first premise-the impartiality of the individual
jurors. Collective bias can only be the result of individual dis-
qualification made more apparent.2 4
Casias is distinguishable from Irvin and Bloeth as presenting an allegation
of implied rather than actual bias. The bias alleged was in part knowledge
22 One cannot assume that the average juror is so endowed with a sense of
detachment, so clear in his introspective perception of his own mental
processes, that he may confidently exclude even the unconscious influence of
his own preconceptions as to probable guilt, engendered by a pervasive pre-
trial publicity.
Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 112-13 (1st Cir. 1952), cited in Irvin v.
Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 727 (1961), quoted in United States ex rel. Bloeth v. Denno,
313 F.2d 364, 372-73 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963).
23 "Were it possible to obtain a jury without any prepossessions whatever respect-
ing the guilt or innocence of the accused, it would be extremely desirable to obtain
such a jury; but this is perhaps impossible, and therefore will not be required."
United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 49, 50-51 (No. 14692g) (C.C.D. Va. 1807)
(Marshall, C.J.); see Irvin v. Dowd, supra note 22, at 722-23; United States v.
Leviton, 193 F.2d 848, 857 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 946 (1952).
This practical problem has led many to advocate eliminating the source of pub-
licity-caused prejudice by broadening the power of the courts to punish for contempt
media which interfere in this way with legal proceedings-a solution which may
violate the first amendment's guarantee of free speech. See generally Irvin v. Dowd,
supra note 22, at 729-30 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ; Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S.
50, 51-53 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring) ; Delaney v. United States, supra note 22,
at 113; Gelb, supra note 16, at 619-26; Note, 60 CoLum. L. Rxv. 349, 370-80 (1960);
Note, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1278 (1959).
24 315 F.2d at 619. The other two members of the court who voted to affirm
the conviction agreed. Id. at 617.
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of facts not ordinarily admissible at this trial-the reliability of previous
testimony of the government witnesses. It seems unlikely, however, that
none of Casias' jurors was affected in his general attitude toward this trial
by his previous service. When a juror has rendered a verdict based in part
on the testimony of a witness, he has probably made a decision about the
credibility of that witness. This decision is likely to affect his view of the
same witness at a later trial, even though the situation may be materially
changed.25 The effect is likely to be greater than the effect of merely being
told by a fellow juror that the witness seemed to be reliable before. In
addition, it is possible that the jurors, particularly the five who had helped
return more than one guilty verdict, may have acquired a positive "set" 26
toward the prosecution's evidence or even toward conviction.
27
Once it becomes likely that jury members have been tainted by general
impressions, as distinguished from improper knowledge of specific facts,
then the reasoning of Irvin and Bloeth is applicable. Although the prej-
udicial influence may not be so strong that any juror who has been exposed
to it need be disqualified, a jury with a substantial number of such jurors
may not meet the constitutional standards of impartiality.
LABOR LAW-UNAUTHORIZED STRIKE DURING CoLLoTIvE
BARGAINING UNPROTECTED BY NLRA
The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers was the certified
bargaining agent of the company's 120 production and maintainance em-
ployees. At a May 2 negotiating session the company presented its "final
offer" to a committee composed of five employees and the union's inter-
national representative. The union leaders scheduled a meeting of all em-
ployees for May 5 to announce and discuss the offer and record the em-
25 As the dissent pointed out, id. at 620-21, this fact has been recognized by some
state courts. Cases cited ibid.; Annot., 160 A.L.R. 753, 769-70 (1946).
Although the jurors' previous decisions were made in the controlled atmosphere
of a courtroom, the reliability of the witness may change from case to case. The
jurors seem likely, however, to give their previous decisions such weight that they will
not take account of this fact.
26 See HILGARD, op. cit. supra note 21, at 212-13. The writer describes an experi-
ment illustrating the phenomenon of "set." Three groups of subjects were asked to
identify an ambiguous picture as showing a pretty young woman or an old hag. Of
the first group, which was shown the picture without preparation, 60% saw the young
woman and 40% the old hag. The second group was first shown a similar picture
which clearly showed a young woman. Every member of that group saw the am-
biguous picture as that of a young woman. The third group was shown as prepa-
ration a similar picture clearly showing an old hag, and 95%o of its members saw
the ambiguous picture as showing an old hag. Id. at 197.
A psychological "set" may, however, have significantly less effect in a criminal
trial, which is a process requiring extended deliberation rather than the initial reaction
of a viewer as he watches a picture flashed before him.27 Against this risk of nonimpartiality must be balanced the difficulty, especially
in a small district, of obtaining jurors who have not served in similar cases with
identical witnesses. As the court pointed out, 315 F.2d at 617, "The appearance of
similar cases on any criminal docket is usual rather than unusual and the reappear-
ance of identical prosecution witnesses is to be expected." This problem is similar
to that of obtaining impartial jurors from a small community saturated with preju-
dicial publicity. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
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ployees' vote on acceptance or rejection. However, two members of the
employees' committee revealed the terms in advance, and on May 3 seventy-
five to eighty of the employees walked out in dissatisfaction. When fifty-
one did not return to work as requested by company supervisors, they were
discharged for violating a plant rule requiring permission before leaving
work. Thirteen of the employees were later denied reinstatement. The
union did not call for, authorize, or sanction the strike and later openly
declared its opposition to it. The Board found that a majority of the
workers had struck and held that the company had violated Sections 8(a)
(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act.1 It therefore ordered
reinstatement of the employees with back pay.2 The Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit rejected the Board's finding of a majority strike 3 and
held that an unauthorized minority strike during collective bargaining was
unprotected activity. NLRB v. Sunbeam Lighting Co., 318 F.2d 661 (7th
Cir. 1963).
Section 7 of the act permits employees to engage in concerted activity
for mutual aid or protection; 4 section 13 provides that the right to strike
shall not be interfered with, impeded, or diminished except as specifically
provided for in the act.5 Therefore, minority activities are not unprotected
when there is a designated bargaining representative 6 unless the activities
violate a provision of an existing collective bargaining agreement,7 an
explicit provision of the act,8 or a "fundamental purpose" 9 of the act. Al-
149 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (1), (3) (1958).
2 Sunbeam Lighting Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1248, 1258 (1962).
3 Between 10:20 a.m. and 11:00 a.m. approximately thirty of the employees re-
turned to work. The Board found that the strike occurred when the seventy-five to
eighty workers remained outside the plant for ten minutes longer than the usual work
break which ended at 10:10 am. The court found that the strike occurred when the
fifty-one employees still remained outside the plant at 11:00 a.m. The National Labor
Relations Act provides: "The findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact
if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be
conclusive." 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1958) ; see Uni-
versal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). The court's rejection of the
Board's finding on this matter is open to serious question.
4 Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ....
49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
549 Stat. 457 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §163 (1958).
6 See, e.g., Firth Carpet Co. v. NLRB, 129 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1942) (minority
strike in fear of losing jobs to nonunion men); Hamilton v. NLRB, 160 F.2d 465
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 762 (1947) (minority strike to protest alleged anti-
union discharge).
7 Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 246 (1962) (dictum); Mastro
Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 280 (1956) (dictum); NLRB v. Sands Mfg.
Co., 306 U.S. 332, 344 (1939).
8 Since an employer must bargain with the certified bargaining representative,
National Labor Relations Act §9(a), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(a) (1958), and since he may not bargain with anyone else, Virginia R.R. v.
System Federation No. 40, Railway Employees, 300 U.S. 515, 548 (1937); Haley v.
Childers, 314 F.2d 610, 615 (8th Cir. 1963), activity which is an attempt to force
formal recognition of another bargaining agent is unprotected.
9 Cox, The Right To Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L.J. 319, 332 (1951).
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though it is clear that a minority of workers cannot attempt to supplant the
certified representative during collective bargaining,'
° the present case
concerns the extent to which minority activity may be unprotected in the
absence of any intent to be recognized as a collective bargaining agent.
In the leading case of NLRB v. Draper Corp.," twenty-five percent
of the workers walked out when they felt that the company representative
was feigning illness to slow the progress of the negotiations. The company
reinstated them voluntarily; however, the court refused to enforce a Board
back pay order, holding that such activity was not protected by section 7.
The opinion offers two bases for the decision. It can be construed as hold-
ing that the minority strikers actually intended to undermine the bargain-
ing process in the particular case,' 2 or that, regardess of intent, minority
strikes during collective bargaining invariably undermine the bargaining
process.'3
In R. C. Can Co.,'4 the union representative called a meeting of the
employees to explain the reasons for the lack of progress in the current
negotiations. The next day a minority of the workers walked out in an
effort to force the company to have more frequent negotiating sessions with
the union. The Board held the strike to be protected even though it was
minority activity, unauthorized by the union, occurring during collective
bargaining. Therefore it is clear that the Board rejected the theory that
such minority strikes have an inherently harmful effect.
15 Instead, the
Board emphasized that the strikers were the core supporters of the union
and that they did not have the purpose of derogating from union author-
ity.' 6 On the other hand, the court in the present case rested on the inherent
harmful effect ground, stating that "whatever may have been the purpose
or intent of the employees who participated in the refusal to resume work
• . . the inherent harmful effect of such action" 17 requires that it be
10 The dissenting Board members in Sunbeam felt that the employees did try to
force the company to bargain with them and stated that to hold the activity protected
in such a case would be to put the company "in the dilemma of either having violated
Section 8(a) (5) by bargaining with the employees rather than their certified repre-
sentative, or of being held to have violated Section 8(a) (1) and (3) by discharging
the strikers who sought to force [the company] . . . into that invidious position."
136 N.L.R.B. at 1263-64. In Dazey Corp., 106 N.L.R.B. 553 (1953), the Board ap-
proved the discharges of two employees for attempting to negotiate the question of
reclassification and pay raises directly with the company. See NLRB v. American
Mfg. Co., 203 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1953); International Envelope Co., 34 N.L.R.B.
1277 (1941); Administrative Ruling of NLRB Gen. Counsel, Case No. F-619, Sept.
15, 1958, 42 L.R.R.M. 1484.
"1145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944).
12 The strike was viewed as "an effort to interfere with the collective bargaining
by the duly authorized bargaining agent selected by all the employees" which is a
strike "in violation of the purposes of the act . . . ." Id. at 202. See Plasti-Line,
Inc. v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 482 (6th Cir. 1960) ; Dazey Corp., 106 N.L.R.B. 553 (1953).
13 "[T]he necessary effect [of such activity] is necessarily destructive of that
collective bargaining which it is the purpose of the act to promote." 145 F.2d at 203.
14 140 N.L.R.B. No. 56, 52 L.R.R.M. 1071 (1963).
15 The Board made no specific reference to Draper in its disposition of this case.
16140 N.L.R.B. No. 56, 52 L.R.R.M. at 1072.
17 Instant case at 663.
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unprotected. It adopted language from Draper that "there can be no
effective bargaining if small groups of employees are at liberty to ignore the
bargaining agency thus set up, take particular matters into their own hands
and deal independently with the employer." 18 The opposite results on
similar facts in Draper and R. C. Can, plus the absence of detailed legal
analysis in the present case, suggest a need for reappraisal of purpose and
effect as standards for determining whether activity is protected by
section 7.
The purposes of the striking group generally fall within three cate-
gories--dissatisfaction with the union's manner of conducting negotiations,
dissatisfaction with the company's manner of conducting negotiations, or
dissatisfaction with the substance of the company's proposals. Concerning
the first, the workers have chosen the union as their bargaining repre-
sentative; the employer should not be penalized when employees feel that
their representative is not acting in their best interests in conducting the
negotiations. If the workers are completely dissatisfied with the repre-
sentation they have received, there are means of repudiating the bargaining
representative.19 The cases dealt with here do not involve attempts totally
to repudiate the union but, rather, strikes for the purpose of expressing
dissatisfaction with the representative's actions in a particular situation.
Although the act does not require a particular method of bargaining, en-
couragement of collective bargaining is a fundamental objective ° The
company and union had established a rational mode of negotiating in the
present case; activity that disrupts this method without providing a sub-
stitute undermines this basic purpose.
Unauthorized strikes which occur as a result of employee dissatisfac-
tion with the company's manner of negotiating are likewise improper. If
the company is engaging in dilatory bargaining procedures, a strike is
justified. It is the bargaining agent, however, who should make the
evaluation of the company's procedures which in turn will lead to a decision
to strike or continue work, since he is most familiar with the company's
patterns of negotiating. Furthermore, when the dilatory procedure in-
volved has been acquiesced in by the collective bargaining representative,
2 '
who was chosen by the workers to make just this sort of decision, the
18 145 F2d at 205.
19 National Labor Relations Act § 9(e), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 159(e) (1958) ; see Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d 1415 (1955).
20 "It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes
of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining .... " National Labor Relations Act § 1, 49
Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958).
21 In R. C. Can, the workers rejected such an evaluation and decision made by
the bargaining agent. Under the proposed criterion, the activity in R. C. Can should
be unprotected. This is true even though there were no adverse effects on the nego-
tiations and even though the strikers were the core supporters of the union.
19641
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unauthorized action of the employees undermines the union's authority
and should be unprotected.2
The effect of an unauthorized strike to protest the substance of the
company's offer may be as grave as a strike to protest procedure, but its
purpose is not as inherently opposed to the objectives of the act. The act
does not dictate the terms of any agreements between employer and em-
ployee; its objective is to facilitate the development of orderly structures
through which the workers can bargain collectively. Therefore, while un-
authorized strikes to protest procedure should be declared unprotected due
to their purpose alone, an unauthorized strike to signify rejection of com-
pany proposals should not be declared unprotected unless it actually has a
serious effect on the bargaining process.
23
The court in the present case focused on whether a majority or
minority of the workers had struck, rather than on the strike's actual effect.
Its finding of a minority strike avoided the issue of an "accelerated rejec-
tion." The Board had held that the strike was simply an early expression
of the predicted refusal 2 and should not be condemned simply because it
came prior to formal submission to the membership.25 This holding was
impossible under the court's view of the facts since a minority has no au-
thority to reject an offer.2 8 In cases like the present, a finding of an ac-
celerated rejection rendering the strike protected activity would be un-
desirable even if a majority had struck. Piecemeal news of the offer
spread quickly through the plant by word of mouth during working
hours, resulting in a spontaneous, disorganized walkout. The oppor-
tunity for discussion and consideration afforded by a procedure estab-
lished by the negotiating parties 2 7 should be encouraged, even though the
act does not require a formal vote. While there is great value in having
vigorous members who do not passively acquiesce in the views of the union
22 Professor Cox seems to agree with this when he states that if Draper
rests upon a ruling that "concerted activities" does not include conduct the
purpose of which is to interfere with collective bargaining by the majority
representative, it is sound enough in principle even though the application of
the principle to the facts may be questioned. . . . Section 7 cannot be sup-
posed to protect activities inconsistent with one of the fundamental purposes
of the Act ....
Cox, supra note 9, at 331-32.
If the purpose of a strike is contrary to the objectives of the act, then the activity
should not be protected simply because fortuitously no adverse effects ensued. Cf.
NLRB v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 189 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1951).
23 The court in Draper did not find it necessary to search for actual adverse
effects since in its view there was an inherently harmful effect. Likewise, the court
in the instant case made no findings of actual adverse effects.
24 See text accompanying note 30 infra.
25 "To hold otherwise would make the time rather than the object the controlling
factor in determining whether a strike is protected or unprotected." 136 N.L.R.B.
at 1254.
26Neither the court, the Board, nor the briefs cite any cases resting on the
accelerated rejection theory.
27 See text preceding note I .supra.
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hierarchy, their militancy should be directed toward policy formulation
within the union.
28
Nevertheless, the substitution of an inferior decision-making process,
the frequent result of a sudden deviation from the planned method, should
not alone make the workers' activity unprotected. However, there were
additional deleterious effects in the present case. At the May 2 negotiating
session the company was told that its proposal would be submitted to the
membership but "it was doubtful whether they would accept it"; 29 there-
fore, the "final offer" did not signify an end to the negotiations such that
the walkout could not have had a deleterious effect on the bargaining. The
union felt that the workers had acted illegally, usurping its functions; 30
it called off union meetings and negotiations with the company while the
work stoppage continued.3 ' While collective bargaining often results in
negotiations being suspended due to an impasse between the union and
the employer on substantive issues, the breakdown in the present case was
due to employee-union dissension. The negotiations did not resume until
six days after the strike when the union discontinued its repudiation of the
workers' actions and assigned a new representative to try to get the com-
pany to reinstate the strikers.3 2 Even though the workers may have
thought they were acting in accordance with the union's aims, the evidence
showed that the activity upset the collective bargaining process and, there-
fore, should be unprotected.
28 See Cox, supra note 9, at 332; NLRB v. Nu-Car Carriers, Inc., 189 F.2d 756
(3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952) (approves minority activity at-
tempting to influence the union's position in forthcoming negotiations).
29 136 N.L.R.B. at 1250.
30 The union's opinion of the strike was shown by a phone call made by a member
of the employees' negotiating committee to the union's international representative.
The employee was told: "You stay in and keep as many of those employees in there
working as you can because this is an illegal strike. And those on the outside haven't
got nothing . . .to stand on whatsoever." Id. at 1262. Even if the representative
did not mean that the strike was illegal under section 7, he at least felt that the strike
was against the union constitution or bylaws.
31 At 6:20 p.m. on the day of the strike the following telegram was received from
the union's international representative:
In discussing the current sitiation (sic) with our Sixth District International
Office it was decided to inform the members of the negotiating committee
that until further notice, there will be no further union or negotiating meet-
ings while the unauthorized work stoppage continues.
Id. at 1252.
32 The fact that the union later ratified the action does not protect the strike;
the harm had been done when union-employee dissension caused suspension of nego-
tiations for six days. Cf. NLRB v. American Mfg. Co., 203 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1953).
If the union had immediately ratified the work stoppage the activity would have been
protected since there would have been no effect on the negotiations other than what is
usually expected in collective bargaining; without an adverse effect, there is no reason
to call the strike unprotected.
33 Instant case at 665 (dissenting opinion).
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SECURITIES-FEDERAL JURISDICTIoN IN ACTIoN UNDER SEC-
TION 14(a) OF SECURITIES Exc ANGE ACT OF 1934 ExTENDS TO
GRANTING OF COMPLETE RELIEF
Shareholder filed suit ' in federal court. The first count of his com-
plaint alleged denial of his preemptive and equitable rights and serious
breaches of fiduciary duty by the corporation's directors.2 The second
count alleged, inter alia,3 that defendants' proxy solicitation violated Section
14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 4 and certain regulations 5
promulgated thereunder. After determining that both counts stated deriva-
tive causes of action, the district court granted defendants' motion for an
order to compel plaintiff to provide security in accordance with the Wis-
consin security for expenses statute.6 When plaintiff refused to obey the
order, the suit was dismissed except insofar as it might be construed as a
suit under section 14(a) for a declaratory judgment concerning the validity
of the proxies solicited. On interlocutory appeal,7 the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that a federal court can grant
relief from the effects of proxies solicited in violation of section 14(a) and
that the state security for expenses provision does not apply to derivative
I This complaint was the last of three amended and supplemental complaints filed
by plaintiff after his unsuccessful attempt to enjoin the corporation from consum-
mating a proposed plan of merger. Instant case at 840.
2 Federal jurisdiction over the first count was based on diversity of citizenship.
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958).
3 Plaintiff also alleged a violation of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1958), which relates to manipulative or deceptive
devices or contrivances in connection with the sale or purchase of securities. The
district court held this section inapplicable to the facts and the appellate court affirmed.
Instant case at 846-47. The allegation of a § 10(b) violation apparently was an attempt
to circumvent Dann v. Studebaker-Packard, 288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1961), discussed
in text accompanying notes 9-10, 30-34 infra. See instant case at 847 n.10.
4 (a) It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to solicit . . . any proxy
or consent or authorization in respect of any security . . .registered on any
national securities exchange in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(a), 48 Stat 895, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1958).
5 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (Supp. 1963) (providing for mandatory furnishing of
certain information to shareholders) ; 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (Supp. 1963) (prohibiting
false or misleading statements in proxy solicitations).
6 (4) In any action brought in the right of any foreign or domestic corpo-
ration by the holder or holders of less than 3 per cent of any class of shares
issued and outstanding, the defendants shall be entitled on application to the
court to require the plaintiff or plaintiffs to give security for the reasonable
expenses, including attorney's fees.
Wis. STAT. § 180.405(4) (1961).
7In the instant case the interlocutory appeal was brought under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) (1958). However, orders for security have also been held immediately
appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1958) as falling within that group of intermediate
orders which are considered too important and possibly determinative of the suit to
be denied review, and too independent of the cause of action itself to require that
appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated. Chabot v.
National Sec. & Research Corp., 290 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1961). See also Cohen v.
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) ; Note, 52 CoLuM. L. REv.
267, 272 n.24 (1952).
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suits brought under that section.8 Borak v. . I. Case Co., 317 F.2d 838
(7th Cir.), cert. granted, 84 Sup. Ct. 195 (1963) (No. 402).
Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act is not explicit about
the available scope of relief or the parties entitled to bring an action. The
district court relied on Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp.,9 which held
that federal jurisdiction under section 14(a) is limited to a declaration of
proxy invalidity 0 and ruled that to the extent that the relief requested 1
went.beyond a declaratory judgment concerning the validity or invalidity
of the proxies, the plaintiff was stating a derivative cause of action under
state law to which the security for expenses statute applied. In reversing,
the appellate court held that section 2712 of the act authorized relief from
the effects of proxy solicitation violative of section 14(a).'1 Several courts
had previously assumed, without deciding, that such relief was available
under section 14(a).'4 In the present case, the court focused on the purpose
sThe appellate court also held that count one stated a personal cause of action
and therefore was not subject to the security for expenses statute.
9288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1961), 75 HARv. L. Rv. 637 (1962), 9 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 232 (1962), 7 VILL. L. Rv. 125 (1961).
'ojudges and commentators have referred to this as "prospective" relief, contrast-
ing it with "retrospective" relief. The term "prospective" may be misleading, since it
suggests that the proxies will be considered invalid only from the date of the decision,
whereas the declaration of invalidity actually operates from the time of solicitation.
11 Plaintiff in the present case asked the court to declare the proxy statement false
and misleading and the proxies solicited illegal and void. He also asked that the
corporate merger, which was predicated on a shareholders' vote, and all agreements
pursuant to the merger, be declared void and that damages be awarded. Complaint,
in Appendix to Brief for Appellant, p. 21.
In asking for rescission of the merger, plaintiff invoked the provisions of § 29(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, see instant case at 846, which provides:
(b) Every contract made in violation of any provision of this title or of any
rule or regulation thereunder . . . shall be void (1) as regards the rights of
any person who, in violation of any such provision, rule, or regulation, shall
have made or engaged in the performance of any such contract, and (2) as
regards the rights of any person who, not being a party to such contract, shall
have acquired any right thereunder with actual knowledge of the facts by
reason of which the making or performance of such contract was in violation
of any such provision, rule, or regulation ....
48 Stat 903 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1958).
The district court ruled that § 29(b) was unavailable as a means of providing
retrospective relief for a § 14(a) violation. Borak v. J. I. Case Co., Civil No.
56-C-247, E.D. Wis., Sept 4, 1962, reprinted in Appendix to Brief for Appellant,
p. 27, 38 n.3. The court of appeals did not discuss § 29(b). For cases dealing with
§ 29(b) see 9 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 232, 237 n.30 (1962).
12 The district courts of the United States . . . shall have exclusive juris-
diction of violations of this title or the rules and regulations thereunder, and
of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or
duty created by this title or the rules and regulations thereunder.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 48 Stat. 902, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(1958).
13 In a number of cases the jurisdictional grant under § 27 has been interpreted
to allow retrospective relief for violation of § 10(b). See cases cited instant case
at 849.
14 Kauder v. United Board & Carton Corp., 199 F. Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1961);
Mack v. Mishkin, 172 F. Supp. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (denying preliminary injunction
because corporate election could be set aside if a violation of § 14(a) were later
shown); Horwitz v. Balaban, 112 F. Supp. 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Doyle v. Milton,
73 F. Supp. 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). Contra, Howard v. Furst, 140 I. Supp. 507 (S.D.
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of section 14(a)-to insure to shareholders full disclosure of material facts
in proxy statements ' 5-and reasoned that the jurisdiction which is con-
ferred by section 27 must be broad enough to effectively protect the right
created by section 14(a).
The foundation for the court's holding is forcefully expressed in Bell v.
Hood,16 the Supreme Court stating that "where federally protected rights
have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will
be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief." 17 The
doctrine has been applied, either consciously or unconsciously, in a number
of cases in which federal courts have devised a satisfactory remedy to com-
plement a federal right.'8 In Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp.,19 the
Supreme Court held that under the Securities Act of 1933 20 the purchasers
of securities would be permitted to bring an action against a party other
than the vendor, even though no such action was expressly authorized by
the act. The Court stated, "[T]he power to make the right of recovery
effective implies the power to utilize any of the procedures or actions
normally available to the litigant according to the exigencies of the par-
ticular case." 21
N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds, 238 F2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S.
937 (1957) (denying rescission of completed corporate transactions based on proxies
allegedly solicited improperly). See text accompanying notes 40-46 infra.
15 Dann v. Studebaker-Packard, 288 F.2d 201, 208 (6th Cir. 1961) ; see SEC v.
Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948) ;
S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 13-14 (1934).
16 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
17 Id. at 684.
18 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960)
(approving decree of reimbursement for loss of wages not specified in Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938) ; Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110,
128 (1948) (permitting divestiture or dissolution decree although not specifically
provided for in Sherman Act) ; Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946)
(authorizing restitution of excess rents collected notwithstanding lack of expression
of such remedy in Emergency Price Control Act of 1942) ; Tunstall v. Brotherhood
of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944) (permitting injunctive relief and damages
not specified in Railway Labor Act) ; Aldred Inv. Trust v. SEC, 151 F.2d 254, 261
(1st Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 795 (1946) (approving decree appointing
receiver although such remedy not specified in Investment Company Act of 1940);
Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422, 426-27 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737
(1944) (allowing damages although not expressly provided for in Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935).
Several cases of this type have involved the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956) (permitting damages in action under
§ 10(b) although not expressly provided for in act); Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (allowing bill of accounting in suit under
§ 10(b) although not expressly provided for in act) ; Geismar v. Bond & Goodwin,
Inc., 40 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (permitting damages under various sections
of the act). See also Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946) ; Board of
Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 350 (1939).
19 311 U.S. 282 (1940).
20 Securities Act of 1933, § 22(a), 48 Stat. 86, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a)
(1958). Section 22(a) of the 1933 act is a jurisdictional provision resembling § 27 of
the 1934 act.
21311 U.S. at 288. Compare the language in Mitchell v. Robert DeMario
jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 291-92 (1960): "When Congress entrusts to an equity
court the enforcement of prohibitions contained in a regulatory enactment, it must
be taken to have acted cognizant of the historic power of equity to provide complete
relief in light of the statutory purposes."
CASE COMMENTS
When a federal statute condemns an act as unlawful, as section 14(a)
proscribes certain modes of proxy solicitation, "the extent and nature of
the legal consequences of the condemnation, though left by the statute to
judicial determination, are nevertheless federal questions, the answers to
which are to be derived from the statute and the federal policy which it has
adopted." 22 It is essential to an effective federal system that, given a con-
gressional objective, the jurisdiction in the federal courts be sufficient to
implement that objective 2 3-to resolve the entire "case or controversy." 24
While a narrow interpretation of the congressional mandate embodied in
section 14(a) might have been possible when the act was first passed 2 5 the
courts have held that effectuation of this section at least demands enjoining
the use of improperly solicited proxies.2 6  Several cases have gone further
in fashioning relief2 7 To undo corporate action authorized by a vote in
which invalid proxies were decisive, as requested in the present case,2 8
seems to differ only in degree.2
In Dann, the federal court proceeding fell far short of a complete reso-
lution effectuating the congressional policy. According to the rule of that
case, in the absence of diversity of citizenship,3 0 the plaintiff will be saddled
2 Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942). See SEC
v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 518 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847
(1948).
23 See also Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Dis-
cretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv.
797, 800 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Mishkin, Variousness]; Mishkin, The Federal
"Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUmn. L. Rxv. 157 (1953).
2
4 Cf. 3 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 2032 (2d ed. 1961).
2
5The legislative history contains no specific statement about the breadth of
relief. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). On its face, § 14(a) might seem to justify only injunction
of future solicitations of proxies in violation of the proxy regulations. Loss, The
SEC Proxy Rules in the Courts, 73 Hagv. L. REv. 1041, 1068 (1960) ; see Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(e), 48 Stat. 900, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1958)
(prescribing injunction procedures).26E.g., SEC v. May, 229 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1956); SEC v. O'Hara Re-election
(or Proxy) Comm., 28 F. Supp. 523 (D. Mass. 1939); Howard v. Furst, 140 F.
Supp. 507, 513 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds, 238 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937 (1957) (injunction available on proper showing but barred
by laches); see Dunn v. Decca Records, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 1, 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1954)
(shareholders' meeting might have been enjoined had proper showing been made).27 See SEC v. Okin, 132 F.2d 784, 787 (2d Cir. 1943) (suggesting that SEC
might be able to procure an order directing correction of misimpression conveyed to
stockholders); Central Foundry Co. v. Gondelman, 166 F. Supp. 429, 446-48 (S.D.
N.Y. 1958) (ordering impending shareholders' meeting adjourned, voiding improperly
solicited proxies, and enumerating specific corrections to be made in proxy materials
subsequently issued); SECv. Transamerica Corp., 67 F. Supp. 326, 334 (D. Del.
1946), modified anI aff'd, 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied 332 U.S. 847(1948) (partially enjoining shareholders' meeting and ordering resolicitation) ; Trate
v. Sonotone Corp., 5 S.E.C. Jud. Dec. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (postponing shareholders'
meeting); SEC v. O'Hara Re-electIon (or Proxy) Comm., 
.d25ra note 26, at 525
(enjoining holding of corporate meeting).t See note 11 uupra.
20 See Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules in the Courts, 73 H. uv. L. Rw¢. 1041, 1072-73(1960): "The Rubicon was crossed when the courts began to enjoin the use of the
proxies notwithstanding the literal limitation of their statutory injunctive power to
restraining further illegal solicitations."
soIf the plaintiff is able to satisfy diversity requirements, the entire controversy
wil be determined by the federal court in one proceeding.
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with the burdens of piecemeal litigation 3 1-long delays, double expenses,
and the necessity of pleading and reproducing many facts.32 Since the
state courts are also precluded from hearing the complete action because
of the statutory grant of "exclusive jurisdiction" to the federal courts on the
proxy validity question,33 there is no single tribunal in which an injured
party can effectuate his federal right. In addition, because this type of
action often involves several defendants, there is a likelihood of numerous
appeals and the possibility of incompatible decisions, since the nationwide
service of process which the Securities Exchange Act provides for the fed-
eral court proceeding 3 4 will not be available to the plaintiff in a state court.
While the law defining relief will be "federal law," 35 two basic alternatives
are available to the court in fashioning relief-the creation of a uniform
federal rule or extensive judicial incorporation of the existing state law into
federal law. 6 State law undoubtedly provides some means of effectuating
81 For discussion, see Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201, 214 (6th
Cir. 1961) ; Loss, The SEC Proxy Rides and State Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1249, 1250
(1960); Demmler, Private Suits Based on Violation of the Proxy Rules, 20 U. PITr.
L. RM. 587, 591 (1959).
32 The duplication of facts will be necessary to familiarize the state court with
the nature of the violation, even though the federal declaratory judgment will pre-
sumably be res judicata in the state action. See 2 ANDERSON, ACTIONS FOR DECLARA-
TORY JUDGMENTS § 459, at 1091 (1951) ; 3 Loss, SEcuRrrIEs REGULATION 2032 (2d ed.
1961).
33 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 48 Stat 902, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(1958) ; Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201, 216 n.47 (6th Cir. 1961)
dictum) (state courts may be without jurisdiction to determine validity); Invest-
ment Associates v. Standard Power & Light Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 225, 239, 48 A.2d
501, 508-09 (Ch. 1946), aff'd, 29 Del. Ch. 593, 606, 51 A.2d 572, 579 (Sup. Ct 1947) ;
Eliasberg v. Standard Oil Co., 23 N.J. Super. 431, 444, 92 A.2d 862, 869 (Ch. 1952),
aff'd per curiam, 12 N.J. 467, 97 A.2d 437 (1953) ; Mekrut v. Gould, 16 Misc. 2d 326,
329-30, 188 N.Y.S.2d 6, 9 (Sup. Ct. 1959); see Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules and
State Law, 73 HARV. L. Rxv. 1249, 1253-77 (1960).
Of fundamental importance is the further question whether a state court can or
will assume jurisdiction at all, even to adjudicate the consequences. Notice the
wording of § 27: "all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any lia-
bility or duty . . . " (Emphasis added.) See Demmler, supra note 31, at 594-95;
Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules and State Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1249, 1251 (1960).
See also 3 Loss, SECURrrIIs REGULATION 2032 (2d ed. 1961). Cf. Remar v. Clayton
Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014, 1017-18 (D. Mass. 1949).
34 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 48 Stat. 902, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa (1958).
35 See text accompanying note 22 supra; 3 Loss, SEcurmRs REGULATION 2031
(2d ed. 1961) ; 2 MooRE,'FEDERAL PRACTICE 2.09, at 456 (2d ed. 1962) ; Mishkin,
Variousness, 105 U. PA. L. REv. at 800; Note, Rules of Decision in Nondiversity
Suits, 69 YALE L. 1428 (1960) ; cf. Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 233 (S.D.
N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
The Dann court seemed to believe erroneously that the law governing the con-
sequences would be state law. Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201, 214
(6th Cir. 1961).
36 Mishkin, Variousness, 105 U. PA. L. REv. at 802. There are numerous possible
combinations involving these two choices. rd. at 803-04. The fact that the charac-
terization of proxies as valid or invalid is to be completely established by a federal
statute does not mean that the consequences must be established by a federal law
which ignores state law. Since Congress made explicit provisions for measuring the
validity of the proxy solicitation (through specific regulations), but set no guidelines
for granting consequential relief, it is arguable that Congress intended that existing
state law would be basically followed. Cf. id. at 825; HART & WECHSLER, THE FED-
ERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 435 (1953).
As to the countervailing argument regarding some resultant lack of uniformity, see
Mishkin, Variousness, 105 U.. PA. L. REv. at 813-14.
CASE COMMENTS
the federal policy, since it clearly would not have left unremedied a use
of proxies which was unlawful under its own standards. While the im-
plementation provided by state law may not be precisely that which a
federal court would design if fashioning the remedy for the first time, it is
difficult to conceive of their being too divergent. Since proxies are com-
monly used in the conduct of corporate affairs and state law controls most
corporate activity, it is desirable that the sanctions placed upon the violation
of federal proxy rules be coordinated with the state law governing related
transactions.37 Therefore, substantial assimilation of state law appears
likely and desirable, 38 although any aspect of state law which impedes im-
plementation of the federal policy should be modified.3 9
The present case raised two other important questions. The first con-
cerns "standing" under section 14(a). As noted above, section 14(a) does
not explicitly say who has standing to bring an action under the provision.
It is clear, of course, that the Securities and Exchange Commission can
enforce the provision" and a number of courts have now determined that
individuals have a civil cause of action under section 14(a) 41 In Howard
37A proxy might be invalid under state law for several reasons other than mis-
leading solicitation-improper signing or failure to date, for example. Under state
law, proxies void for either of the above mentioned reasons might simply be discounted
in shareholder voting; for a § 14(a) violation, a plausible federal remedy devised
without reference to state law would be to void the entire election. This lack of
coordination might occur even though the lesser remedy would effectively implement
the federal statutory purpose.
38 For a discussion of the factors that should operate in deciding which state's
law is to be chosen in a particular case see Mishkin, Variousness, 105 U. PA. L. Ray.
at 805-08.
39 See generally Mishkin, Variousness.
40 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21 (e) (f), 48 Stat. 900-01, as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 78u(e) (f) (1958).
41 Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201, 208-09 (6th Cir. 1961) ; see
Kauder v. United Board & Carton Corp., 199 F. Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) ; Mack
v. Mishkin, 172 F. Supp. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Gaudiosi v. Franklin, 166 F. Supp.
353 (E.D. Pa. 1958), modified, 269 F.2d 873 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902
(1959); Central Foundry Co. v. Gondeliman, 166 F. Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1958);
Howard v. Furst, 140 F. Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y.) (dictum), aff'd but specific question
left open, 238 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937 (1957) ; Weeks v.
Alpert, 131 F. Supp. 608 (D. Mass. 1955) ; Rosen v. Alleghany Corp., 133 F. Supp.
858 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) ; Dunn v. Decca Records, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) ;
Tate v. Sonotone Corp., 5 S.E.C. Jud. Dec. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) ; Phillips v. United
Corp., 5 S.E.C. Jud. Dec. 445, 456-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), appeal dismissed sub noM.
Phillips v. SEC, 171 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1948); Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules in the
Courts, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1041, 1054-58 (1960); Demmler, supra note 31, at 593 n.25.
A number of sections of the 1934 act other than § 14(a) have been held to create
a private right of action. E.g., Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944) (§6(b)); Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014
(D. Mass. 1949) (§ 7(c)) ; Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956) (§ 10(b)) ;
Hawkins v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Ark.
1949) (§ 11(d)) ; Coburn v. Warner, 110 F. Supp. 850 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (§ 15(c));
Geismar v. Bond & Goodwin, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (§ 29(b)).
Three sections of the act expressly provide for the creation of private causes of
action for violation: § 9(e) (manipulation of security prices), § 16(b) (insider profits),
§ 18(a) (liability for misleading statements in sale of stock). 48 Stat 890, 896,
897-98 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§78i(e), 78p(b), 78r(a) (1958). See gen-
erally Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules in the Courts, 73 HARv. L. Rrv. 1041, 1045-58
(1960).
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v. Furs,42 the plaintiff brought a derivative suit under section 14(a), but
the court rejected his contention that section 14(a) created a civil cause
of action for the corporation which might be enforced by shareholders.43
The court in Dann, on facts nearly identical to those in Howard, avoided
the derivative action question by finding plaintiffs' suit a personal and
primary one. There are a number of cases, however, which suggest that
the corporation itself has a right of action for violation of section 14(a). 4
In permitting the plaintiff to proceed, the court in the present case was
certainly allowing a personal action, and arguably was ruling, sub silentio,
that a derivative action may be brought under section 14(a). 4 5 Allowance
of a derivative suit under this section seems proper. Once the section has
been construed to create private rights in individuals, there is no apparent
reason for denying those rights to a corporation. The primary intention
of Congress being to protect the shareholders' right to a full and fair dis-
closure of material facts in corporate voting by proxy, this objective is
properly served by a derivative action on behalf of a reluctant corporation.46
42238 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937 (1957), 70 HARv. L.
REv. 1493 (1957). The case has been much criticized. See, e.g., Loss, The SEC
Proxy Rules in the Courts, 73 HIAtv. L. Rzv. 1041, 1060-62 (1960) ; 105 U. PA. L.
Rxv. 1016 (1957).
43 We find nothing in the language of Section 14(a) or in the legislative
history of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to warrant an inference that
it was the intention of the Congress to create any rights whatever in a corpo-
ration whose stockholders may be solicited by proxy statements prepared in
contravention of the statutory mandate.
Ambiguous or equivocal language would hardly be sufficient to support
an innovation of such far reaching effects.
238 F.2d at 793.
Moreover, the court specifically left open the more basic question "of whether
and to what extent Section 14(a) may be construed as creating substantive rights
in an individual stockholder." Id. at 793. See Subin v. Goldsmith, 224 F.2d 753,
774 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 883 (1955) (leaving the same question open).
But cf. the dictum in the opinion of Frank, J., concurring in part, in Subin v. Gold-
smith, supra at 762 (private right under § 14(a) must be enforced derivatively).
44See Rosen v. Alleghany Corp., 133 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (motion
by corporation and another defendant counterclaiming under § 14(a) provisionally
denied on condition that plaintiffs purge their proxy solicitation materials) ; Lapchak
v. Sisto, CCH Fmn. SEc. L. REP. 1190721 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (in derivative action for
damages court assumed § 14(a) created such a right of action although it found no
causal connection between damages alleged and violation alleged); Central Foundry
Co. v. Gondelman, 166 F. Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (SEC and corporate board
of directors, both plaintiffs, entitled to injunction in action brought under § 14(a));
cf. Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960) (corporation
has private right of action under § 10(b) of the act).
45 The second count stated a claim which could be construed as derivative in
nature. See the facts reiterated by the court, instant case at 842-44, 846, and the
relief which plaintiff sought, instant case at 846. The court's treatment of the count
is consistent with such a reading. See instant case at 849. The lower court must
have construed the second count as derivative since it applied the security for expenses
statute. See instant case at 841. The issue was argued to the court of appeals in
the briefs of the parties. Brief for Defendants-Appellees, pp. 33-36; Reply Brief for
Plaintiff-Appellant, pp. 1-11. The Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae, p. 7, filed
in support of plaintiff, states only that a private right of action has been established
under the act; no specific mention is made of derivative suits.
46 A former chairman of the SEC has taken a similar position. Demmler, supra
note 31, at 589:
[P]ublic interest and the interest of investors can be best served, and corpo-
rate jurisprudence can be developed most systematically, by relatively liberal
CASE COMMENTS
The other issue in the present case concerned the applicability of the
Wisconsin security for expenses statute to the federal cause of action in-
volved. After deciding that section 14(a) provided a retrospective remedy,
the court, relying on McClure v. Borne Chein. Co.47 and Fielding v. Allen,48
summarily ruled that security was not necessary. 49 Although this holding
followed automatically from the terms of the state statute if the court did not
view the proceeding as derivative, the decision seems correct in any event.
State security for expenses statutes 50 were enacted to help eliminate "strike
suits" brought in the hope of an easy settlement.51 When the defendants
in a derivative action demand security from a plaintiff whose action is
brought in a federal court to enforce a federal statutory right,5 2 and the
federal statute offers no guidance as to the applicability of such a state stat-
ute, the state law may be applied only if it does not hinder the effectuation
of the federal policy.53 In Fielding, the court held that the New York
security for expenses statute was inapplicable in a derivative action based
on federal statutes dealing with transportation.5 4  The court in McClure
recognition of the standing of a private person claiming injury caused by
a material violation of the proxy rules to urge in court his individual interest,
the interest of the class to which he belongs or, derivatively, the interest of
the corporation itself.
47292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961).
48 181 F.2d 163, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 817 (1950).
49 Instant case at 849.
50 Eight states have such statutes: California, CAL. CORP. CODE § 834(b) ; Colo-
rado, COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31-30-21 (Supp. 1960); Maryland, MD. RULES PRoc.
§ 328(b) ; New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:3-15 (Supp. 1962); New York, N.Y.
GEN. CORP. LAw § 61-b; North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19-48 (1960); Penn-
sylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1322 (Supp. 1960); and Wisconsin, Wis. STAT.
§ 180.405(4) (1961). These statutes provide, in general, that the corporation, in a
derivative suit brought by a shareholder or shareholders whose stock does not repre-
sent a certain percentage (usually five percent) of the outstanding stock of any class
or whose stock does not have a specified market value, may move to have the plaintiff
furnish a bond for reasonable expenses of the corporation and for those of others
for which the corporation may become liable. The California provision is substantially
different.
51 See generally, e.g., HENN, CoRloRAlioNs 588-92 (1961); 52 COLUm. L. REv.
267 (1952).
52 Prior to 1949 there was doubt as to whether state security for expenses statutes
were procedural or substantive in nature and some courts had expressed the belief
that they were of the former type. See Stella v. Kaiser, 81 F. Supp. 807, 808 (S.D.
N.Y. 1948). However, Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541,
555-56 (1949), ruled that such statutes were substantive and must be applied in
diversity suits under the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In
the instant case the allegation of diversity jurisdiction in the second count was disposed
of as surplusage. Instant case at 847 n.10; cf. Fielding v. Allen, 181 F.2d 163, 166 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 817 (1950); Hoover v. Allen, 180 F. Supp. 263, 267
(S.D.N.Y. 1960) (both striking diversity allegation).
83 See, e.g., Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 152 (1944); Sola
Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942) ; Board of County Comm'rs
v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 351-52 (1939); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Kenny,
240 U.S. 489, 493-94 (1916); Fahs v. Martin, 224 F.2d 387, 392 (5th Cir. 1955);
Note, Rides of Decision in Nondiversity Suits, 69 YALE L.J. 1428 (1960).
5 4 See 181 F.2d at 165, 166.
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held similarly in an action involving section 10(b) 55 of the Securities Ex-
change Act. Although it undermines the state policy embodied in the
security for expenses statute,56 the decision in McClure seems correct.
57
The McClure rationale--reluctance to attach such a controversial,
58
unique,59 and restrictive statute to a federal right without any indication
from Congress that it should apply 60-is equally applicable to section 14 (a).
6548 Stat. 891 (1938), 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (1958). A number of other courts
had preceded McClure in determining that the state security for expenses statutes
were not compatible with various federal legislation. Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co.,
188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Hoover v. Allen, 180 F. Supp. 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1960);
Breswick & Co. v. Briggs, 136 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
967 (1956); Stella v. Kaiser, 81 F. Supp. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
Z6 While the state statute will not apply in a nondiversity suit, FED. R. CIv. P.
23(c) will, and that rule would seem at least partially to serve the same purpose as
the state statute. The rule provides that "a class action shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the court"
67 See the discussions of the McClure case in 15 VAND. L. REv. 640 (1962) and
7 VILL. L. Rxv. 292 (1962).
58See, e.g., BALLANTINE, CoRPoRATIoNs § 157(a) (rev. ed. 1946); 2 OLECK,
MODERN CORpoRATION LAWv § 1030, at 837 (1959); Hornstein, The Death Knell of
Stockholders' Derivative Suits in New York, 32 CALmI. L. REv. 123 (1944) ; Horn-
stein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 COLUm. L. Rxv. 1 (1947).
59 As pointed out in note 50 supra, only a small number of states have such
statutes.
60 The first state security for expenses statute, New York's, did not become effec-
tive until 1945, more than ten years after the passage of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.
